A taxonomy of incentive patterns - the design space of incentives for cooperation

In ad hoc networks, devices must cooperate in order to compensate for the absence of infrastructure. Yet, autonomous devices are free to decide whether to cooperate or not. Hence, incentives are indispensable to induce cooperation between autonomous devices. Recently, several approaches have been suggested that stimulate cooperation among devices. In this report, we point out that these approaches fall short of exploiting the design space of incentives for cooperation. Therefore, we introduce incentive patterns as a means of systematically conceiving incentive schemes with respect to the specifics of the application environment. Based on economics, we derive several incentive patterns and discuss them with respect to a set of general characteristics. Consequently, we propose a taxonomy that classifies the derived incentive patterns. Lastly, we exemplify systematic design of incentive schemes in the context of our DIANE project

A framework for dealing with dynamic buildings

ABSTRACT: The design world of architects and engineers is changing. Costs arising during the whole life cycle of a building are being taken into account. Therefore, complex tools to support design decisions are coming up, and an increasing number of experts from a great variety of disciplines will have to cooperate in a more and more interrelated and sophisticated manner. Our hypothesis is, that an integrated framework based on the metaphor of a "dynamic building" as component-based, spatial model will bridge between the infor-mation technical representation and the "classical" building planning. All planning, cooperation, usage, and aging processes of the building life cycle will be reflected in such a "virtual" dynamic building, for which we are developing an appropriate framework

A Taxonomy of Incentive Patterns The Design Space of Incentives for Cooperation

Abstract. Peer-to-peer systems, multi-agent systems, and ad hoc networks aim at exploiting synergies that result from cooperation. Yet, these systems are composed of autonomous entities that are free to decide whether to cooperate or not. Hence, incentives are indispensable to induce cooperation between autonomous entities. In this paper, we introduce incentive patterns as a means of systematically conceiving incentive schemes with respect to the specifics of the application environment. Based on economic incentive patterns, we derive several incentive patterns and discuss them with respect to a set of general characteristics. Consequently, we propose a taxonomy that classifies the derived incentive patterns.

A tool for integrated design and implementation of conversations in multi-agent systems

Multiagent systems form promising paradigm for software development in complex application domains, but unfortunately tend to be complex systems themselves. The existing gap between analysis and design of multiagent systems and their implementation leads to an increased programming effort. In this paper, we present a graphical tool which tries to bridge this gap by integrating the design and implementation of agent conversations. The tool is implemented, as a plugin, for the integrated development environment Eclipse. Its use follows a conversation programming workflow which supports Agent UML and finite state machines as graphical notations. It is shown how the in-memory representation based on the description language cpXML, is automatically translated into source code for the multiagent framework JADE

How social structure improves distributed reputation systems - three hypotheses

Abstract. Reputation systems provide an incentive for cooperation in artificial societies by keeping track of the behavior of autonomous entities. The self-organization of P2P systems demands for the distribution of the reputation system to the autonomous entities themselves. They may cooperate by issuing recommendations of other entities ’ trustworthiness. The recipient of a recommendation has to assess its truthfulness before taking it into account. The current assessment methods are based on plausibility considerations that have several inherent limitations. Therefore, in this paper, we propose social structure as a means of overcoming some of these limitations. For this purpose, we examine the properties of social structure and discuss how distributed reputation systems can make use of them. This leads us to the formulation of three hypotheses of how social structure overcomes the limitations of plausibility considerations. In addition, it is pointed out how the hypotheses can be tested.

Agent Dependability as an Architectural Issue ⋆

Abstract. Layered architectures are a proven principle for the design of software systems and components. The paper introduces a layered reference architecture for software agents which assigns each agent property to select layers. It demonstrates how the same reference architecture provides a framework for a dependability model that locates the sources of failures and the ensuing error handling with a specific layer, thus integrating dependability directly into the design of agents.

P.: Robust multi-agent systems: The transactional conversation approach

Abstract. Before industry can adopt Multi-Agent System (MAS) critical issues like safety and security must be solved. The first part of this paper introduces an implementation architecture that serves as a framework to discuss the various aspects of MAS safety, and to classify the many heterogeneous approaches in this field. In the second part of the paper we present our own approach to increase MAS safety. Its key idea is to use transaction-based robustness mechanisms known from database management systems and to incorporate them into a robust FIPA-compliant MAS development framework. In particular, agent conversations are treated as distributed transactions, leading to the so-called transactional conversations. We discuss, how an appropriate transactional semantics can be derived from the formal semantics of the conversations’ speech acts.

How Social Structure Improves Distributed Reputation Systems - Three Hypotheses

Reputation systems provide an incentive for cooperation in artificial societies by keeping track of the behavior of autonomous entities